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In 1776 the first Constitution of North Carolina was adopted. The
experiences of that period were naturally conducive to the idea that
certain rights and privileges of the governed were fundamental and
should be placed beyond legislative, executive, or judicial control. These
fundamental rights were so jealously regarded that the North Carolina
Constitutional Convention of 1788 refused to ratify the proposed Fed-
eral Constitution until the adoption in that instrument of the Bill of
Rights, calculated to secure these rights, was assured.1 Among the
rights thus protected, in both Federal and State Constitutions, is that
of the accused, in all criminal prosecutions, ". . . To confront the ac-
cusers and witnesses with other testimony .... " Agreeably to the
admonition that "A frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is
absolutely necessary to preserve the blessings of liberty,"3 it is the pur-
pose here to examine the measure of protection this provision affords
the accused, its nature and extent, and the circumstances under which
it may be lost.
4
Confrontation may be claimed as of right "In all criminal proceed-
ings . . .", which includes trials of common law and statutory crimes.
A question arises, however, as to whether it may be so claimed in cases
of a hybrid nature.5 Proceedings to disbar attorneys,6 to commit luna-
IIV ELLio's DEBATES ON FEDERAL CONSTUnON, 1788-1836, at 237-242; State
v. Love, 187 N. C. 32, 121 S. E. 20 (1923); State v. Dowdy, 145 N. C. 432, 58
S. E. 1002 (1907).
- N. C. CoNs'., Declaration of Rights, §7 (1776) ; N. C. CoNsT., Art. I, §11;
U. S. CoNsT., AmEND. VI. The federal right is differently phrased. It is to the
effect that, "In all criminal prosecutions the accused . . . shall enjoy the right to
be confronted with the witnesses against him. . . " The terminology varies with
different state constitutions. No distinction based on this variance seems to be
drawn.
N. C. Const., Art. I, §29 (1868).
'This note supplements Coates, Limitations on Investigating Officers, 15 N. C.
L. REV. 229, 242 (1937). A critical analysis of the rules of evidence and procedure
is here impossible. However, those of particular interest in their effect on con-
frontation will be noted.
At one time, in North Carolina, the begetting of a bastard child was regarded
as a criminal offense. State v. Mitchell, 119 N. C. 784, 25 S. E. 783 (1896). Under
N. C. GEN. STAT. §49-2 (1943) this act is no longer regarded as a criminal of-
fense. State v. Dill, 224 N. C. 57, 29 S. E. 2d 145 (1944).
o In re West, 212 N. C. 189, 193 S. E. 134 (1937) ; In re Stiers, 204 N. C. 48,
167 S. E. 382 (1932) ; In re Ebbs, 150 N. C. 44, 63 S. E. 190 (1908).
N. C. GEN. STAT. §84-28 (1943) is the statutory authority for disbarment pro-
ceedings. N. C. GEN. STAT. §84-36 (1943) preserves the court's inherent power
over its officers. N. C. GENi. STAT. §84-30 (1943) protects accused's right to
compulsory process and counsel, but not confrontation.
it re West, stupra, states that, "It is not after the manner of our courts, how-
ever, to deprive a lawyer, any more than anyone else, of his constitutional guaran-
ties or to revoke his license without due process of law." This statement is under-
stood to indicate that the rules applicable to civil actions will be enforced.
1950]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
tics7 and alcoholics,8 and to punish for contempt are not restricted by
this constitutional provision. Cases within the jurisdiction of the ju-
venile courts are not considered to be criminal in nature,1 0 and they
too may be conducted without recognizing this provision. But the
defendant must be accorded the right of confrontation in proceedings
before administrative agencies involving criminal sanctions."1
The constitutional right of confrontation was designed to prevent
the conviction of tefendants in criminal cases by the use of ex parte
affadavits and extrajudicial testimony. 12 Therefore, confrontation is
'IN. C. GEN. STAT. §35-2 (1943) relates primarily to guardianship of lunatics
and inebriates. Proceedings for commitment to state hospitals for the insane are
had under N. C. GEN. STAT. §§122-42 to 68.1 (1947 Supp.). The clerk of court
may act on sworn affidavits of two physicians. A jury trial is not available under
the commitment provisions. In re Cook, 218 N. C. 384, 11 S. E. 2d 142 (1940).
N. C. Gm. STAT. §§122-75, 79 (1945 Supp.) relate to commitment to private
hospitals. The presence of the lunatic at the hearing before the clerk is not ex-
pressly required by these provisions, nor by those relating to state hospitals. But
see Bethea v. McLennon, 23 N. C. 523, 526 (1841) (Dictum states that denial of
lunatic's right to be present would be grounds for setting aside an inquisition.).
See 5 WIGMoR, Ev DzNcE §1400 (3rd ed. 1940). Wigmore condemns statutes
which allow the hearing to be held in the absence of the alleged lunatic.
'N. C. G, . STAT. §§35-30 to 35 (1943); N. C. GEN. STAT. §35-35.1 (1945
Supp.).
' Contempt proceedings are sid generis. If the contempt is direct summary
punishment may be inflicted. N. C. GEN. STAT. §5-5 (1943) ; State v. Little, 175
N. C. 743, 94 S. E. 680 (1918) ; In re Brown, 168 N. C. 417, 84 S. E. 690 (1915);
Ex parte McCown, 139 N. C. 95, 51 S. E. 957 (1905).
If the contempt is indirect the court makes findings of fact based on testimony
or affidavits. In re Adams, 218 N. C. 379, 11 S. E. 2d 163 (1940) ; In re Walker,
82 N. C. 95 (1880).
Where acts are punishable as for contempt findings of fact are supported by
affidavits. Safie Manufacturing Co. v. Arnold, 228 N. C. 375, 45 S. E. 2d 577;
it re Deaton, 105 N. C. 59, 11 S. E. 244 (1890).
Where the act is an indirect contempt or is punishable as for contempt it is
apparently in the court's discretion to take evidence by affidavit or by testimony
at the hearing on the order to show cause. The cases cited do not hold that the
contemnor may not present testimony at the hearing.
10 N. C. GEN. STAT. §§110-21, 24 (1943) ; State v. Burnett, 179 N. C. 735, 102
S. E. 711 (1920); In re Watson, 157 N. C. 340, 72 S. E. 1049 (1911). The
jurisdictional age limit of the juvenile court is 16 years, unless the child commits
a felony punishable by more than 10 years imprisonment, in which case the age
limit is 14 years. N. C. GEN. STAT. 110-29 (1943) ; State v. Smith, 213 N. C. 299,
195 S. E. 819 (1938).
"' Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938) ; Wong Wing v. United States,
163 U.S. 228 (1895) ; United States v. Zucker, 161 U.S. 475 (1895). See Morgan
v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 14, 18 (1938). See Note 28 N. C. L. REv. 85 (1949).
Helvering v. Mitchell, supra at 402, states that "Civil procedure is incompatible
with the accepted rules and constitutional guaranties governing the trial of criminal
prosecutions, and where civil procedure is prescribed for the enforcement of reme-
dial sanctions (by administrative agencies), those rules and guaranties do not
apply ... furthermore, the defendant has no constitutional right to be confronted
with the witnesses against him . . .". The inference, of course, is that if the
agency is enforcing a criminal sanction confrontation must be preserved (italics
supplied).
12 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934) ; Mattox v. United States, 156
U.S. 237 (1894) (The Mattox Case is an excellent example of the manner in which
rules of evidence may be shaped to defeat justice. The majority held, first, that
the death of a witness was sufficient ground for admitting his testimony given at
[Vol. 7.8
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regarded as a constitutional embodiment of the common law rule that
the accused is entitled to an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses
against him.13 This, in effect, preserves principally the defendant's
right to have the common law hearsay rule of evidence enforced. A
derivative, though not insignificant, benefit accruing from the enforce-
ment of the hearsay rule is that witnesses are required to testify in the
presence of the jury and the defendant.' 4 The jury is thus enabled to
form a critical estimate of the witness' credibility as it is affected by
his deportment and demeanor.
Since the common law hearsay rule was not absolute, but subject
to exceptions, defendant's constitutional right to an opportunity to cross-
examine is also subject to exceptions.15 Among the exceptions recog-
nized in North Carolina in criminal cases are: Testimony at former
trial,' 6 dying declarations,' 7 reputation,lS pedigree,' 9 official statements
a prior trial, and, second, that defendant was precluded from impeaching the dead
witness at the second trial by his statements made after the first trial, on the
ground that a proper foundation could not be laid. The latter holding exhibits
more interest in protecting the honor of a deceased witness than in giving a live
defendant a fair trial. This view cannot be too strongly condemned.).
" State v. Perry, 210 N. C.- 796, 188 S. E. 639 (1936) ; State v. Breece, 206
N. C. 92, 173 S. E. 9 (1934) ; State v. Hightower, 187 N. C. 300, 121 S. E. 616
(1924) ; State v. Dixon, 185 N. C. 727, 117 S. E. 170 (1923) ; State v. Thomas,
64N. C. 74 (1870) ; State v. Webb, 2 N. C. 103 (1794). Accord, Mattox v.
United States, supra note 12; 5 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE §1395 (3rd ed. 1940).
The North Carolina Supreme Court has excluded hearsay evidence in a num-
ber of criminal cases without reference to defendant's right of confrontation. See
State v. Kluttz, 206 N. C. 726, 175 S. E. 81 (1934).
The North Carolina view that hearsay may be admitted for the purpose of
corroboration lessens the scope of the constitutional protection. See STANSBURY,
NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE §§51, 52, and 79.
The State's contentions may be stated in the trial judge's charge to the jury
in such a manner as to infringe upon defendant's right to confrontation. See State
v. Love, 187 N. C. 32, 121 S. E. 20 (1923).
The question as to whether the admission in evidence of a witness' "past recol-
lection recorded" infringes on the right of confrontation has not been decided in
North Carolina. Kinsey v. State, 49 Ariz. 201, 65 P. 2d 1141 (1937) holds that
the admission of such evidence does not impair the right to cross-examine since
the witness may be impeached, and his ability to observe attacked. The witness
has already admitted that he has no present recollection of the facts.
1' State v. Hartsfield, 188 N. C. 357, 124 S. E. 629 (1924) ; State v. Thomas,
supra note 13; 5 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE §1395 (3rd ed. 1940). Wigmore terms it
"demeanor evidence." For a well-stated opinion as to the value of demeanor evi-
dence see Creamer v. Bivert, 214 Mo. 743, 113 S. W. 1118 (1908).
" State v. Dowdy, 145 N. C. 432, 58 S. E. 1002 (1907). Accord, Mattox v.
United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1894) ; State v. Springs, 184 N.C. 768, 114 S. E.
851 (1922) ; State v. Behrman, 114 N. C. 797, 19 S. E. 220 (1894) ; 5 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE §1397 (3rd ed. 1940).
For an interesting view contra see dissent by Browne, Ch. J., in Blackwell v.
State, 79 Fla. 709, 86 So. 224. 15 A. L. R. 465 (1920).
" State v. Ham, 224 N. C. 128, 29 S. E. 2d 449 (1944) (Testimony given at
habeas corpus proceeding) ; State v. Casey, 204 N. C. 411, 168 S. E. 512 (1933)
(Testimony given at former trial) ; State v. Maynard, 184 N. C. 653, 113 S. E. 682
(1922) (Testimony given at preliminary hearing); STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA
EVIDENCE §146 (1946). Cf. State v. Levy, 187 N. C. 581, 122 S. E. 386 (1924)
(Defendant proffered evidence given at former trial. Witness had died pending
second trial. Stenographer remembered direct testimony of dead witness but had
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and certificates, 20 entries in the regular course of business,21 res gestae,22
verbal acts,23 statements of mental and physical condition,24 statements
of intent,2 5 and spontaneous exclamations. 20 Further, the attitude
generally prevails that the constitutional provision did not solidify the
common law exceptions, but that other exceptions might be developed. 27
This view, of course, should not be followed to the point of extinguish-
ing the rule by the exceptions. Inherent limitations imposed by the
intendment of the provision should be recognized.28
Defendant is entitled by confrontation to present such defense as he
may have by producing evidence in his own behalf,29 as distinguished
forgotten cross-examination by State. Held; Proper to exclude evidence offered.
All must be offered or none will be admitted.)
" State v. Debnam, 222 N. C. 266, 22 S. E. 2d 562 (1942) ; State v. Puett,
210 N. C. 633, 188 S. E. 75 (1936) ; State v. Wallace, 203 N. C. 284, 165 S. E.
716 (1932) (This exception applies only to prosecutions for homicide.).
18 State v. Harrill, 224 N. C. 477, 31 S. E. 2d 353 (1944) ; State v. Miller,
224 N. C. 228, 29 S. E. 2d 751 (1944) ; N. C. GEN. STAT. §14-206 (1943) ; STANS-
BURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE §148 (1946).
1 State v. Trippe, 222 N. C. 600, 24 S. E. 2d 340 (1943) ; State v. Hairston,
121 N. C. 579, 28 S. E. 492 (1897); STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE §149
(1946).
20 State v. Dowdy, 145 N. C. 432, 58 S. E. -1002 (1907) ; State v. Morris, 84
N. C. 757 (1881); STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE §§153, 154 (1946).
Cf. State v. Blakeney, 194 N. C. 651, 140 S. E. 433 (1927).
" State v. Lippard, 223 N. C. 167, 25 S. E. 2d 594 (1943), cert. denied 320 U. S.
749 (1943); State v. Shipman, 202 N. C. 518, 163 S. E. 657 (1932). Contra:
State v. Thomas, 64 N. C. 74 (1870).
22 State v. Carraway, 181 N. C. 561, 107 S. E. 142 (1921) ; State v. Davis,
177 N. C. 573, 98 S. E. 785 (1919) ; STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE §158
(1946).2' State v. Davis, supra note 22; State v. Worthington, 64 N. C. 594 (1870);
State v. Huntley, 25 N. C. 418 (1843) ; STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE
§159 (1946).
24 State v. Lagerholm, 208 N. C. 195, 179 S. E. 644 (1935) ; State v. Jeffreys,
192 N. C. 318, 135 S. E. 32 (1926); State v. Prytle, 191 N. C. 698, 132 S. E.
785 (1926) ; State v. Cooper, 170 N. C. 719, 87 S. E. 50 (1915) ; State v. Draughon,
151 N. C. 677, 65 S. E. 913 (1909) ; STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE §161
(1946). Cf. State v. Hargrave, 97 N. C. 457, 1 S. E. 774 (1887).
2" State v. Rice, 222 N. C. 634, 24 S. E. 2d 483 (1943) ; State v. Bowser, 214
N. C. 249, 199 S. E. 31 (1938) ; State v. Lagerholm, supra note 24; State v. Bry-
son, 60 N. C. 477 (1864); STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE §161 (1946).
Contra; State v. Skidmore, 87 N. C. 509 (1882).
2 State v. Dills, 204 N . C. 33, 167 S. E. 459 (1932) ; State v. McCourry, 128
N. C. 594, 38 S. E. 883 (1901); STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE §164
(1946).
27 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107 (1934); State v. Dowdy, 145
N. C. 432, 436 58 S. E. 1002, 1004 (1907) ; 5 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE §1397 (3rd ed.
1940). Contra : Salinger v. United States, 272 U. S. 542, 548 (1926) ("The pur-
pose of that provision, this Court often has said, is to continue and preserve that
right, and not to broaden it or disturb the exceptions.").
N. C. GEN. STAT. §14-206 (1943) is an example of legislative creation of ex-
ceptions to the hearsay rule. State v. Barrett, 138 N. C. 630, 50 S. E. 506 (1905)
discusses the power of the Legislature to create new rules of evidence.
28 Wigmore's principles of exceptions to the hearsay rule, "necessity" and "cir-
cumstantial probability of trustworthiness," might here be adopted to secure con-
formance to the purposes of the constitutional provision. 5 WIGMIORE, EVIDENCE
§§1420-1422 (3rd ed. 1940).
2" State v. Farrell, 223 N. C. 321, 28 S. E. 2d 560 (1943) ; State v. Utley, 223
N. C. 39, 25 S. E. 2d 195 (1943).
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from, and in addition to, the right to test any testimony produced on
behalf of the State by cross-examination. Indeed, a literal interpreta-
tion of the constitutional phraseology would seem to emphasize de-
fendant's right to bring in his own evidence for the purposes of contra-
dicting the testimony produced by the State and establishing affirmative
defenses rather than his right to test incriminating testimony.3o Two
of the earlier North Carolina cases, while not denying that confronta-
tion preserved defendant's right to cross-examine State's witnesses, took
this view.3 ' The shift in emphasis from presenting the defense to cross-
examination comes with later cases. However, it should not be sup-
posed that confrontation exempts the defendant from the application of
the usual rules of evidence in presenting his defense. The blade has
two edges. The State is also entitled to test defendant's witnesses by
cross-examination.
3 2
Not only does defendant's right to confront witnesses require that
the hearsay rule be enforced, but it also requires that defendant be al-
lowed a reasonable time, as determined by the facts of the particular
case, to prepare his defense.33  This question is generally raised by a
motion for continuance. Ordinarily the action taken on such motion
rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge, and will not be reversed
in the absence of abuse of discretion. 34 But when it is claimed that a
constitutional right has been denied by refusal to grant a continuance
the question presented is one of law and is reviewable on appeal.3 5
Confrontation, in this respect, duplicates the constitutional right to coun-
sel,36 but the protection thus afforded is not merely cumulative since
the right to an opportunity to prepare his defense is preserved whether
"N. C. Coxsr., Art. I, §11 (1868) (".. . with other testimony . . .").
"State v. Tilghman, 33 N. C. 513 (1850); State v. Sparrow, 7 N. C. 487
(1819).
" State v. English, 201 N. C. 295, 159 S. E. 318 (1931), Note, 10 N. C. L. Rv.
84 (1931) (Confession by third party excluded.) ; State v. Collins, 189 N. C. 15, 126
S. E. 98 (1924) (Statement by third party of defendant's willingness to surrender
excluded.) ; State v. Levy, 187 N. C. 581, 122 S. E. 386 (1924) (Evidence given
at former trial excluded because witness unable to remember State's cross-exam-
ination.) ; State v. Beverly, 88 N. C. 632 (1883) (Evidence of conviction of third
party for same crime excluded.).
" State v. Farrell, 223 N. C. 321, 26 S. E. 2d 322 (1943) ; State v. Utley, 223
N. C. 39, 25 S. E. 2d 195 (1943) ; State v. Whitfield, 206 N. C. 696, 175 S. E.
93, cert. denied, 293 U. S. 556 (1934) ; State v. Garner, 203 N. C. 361, 166 S. E.
180 (1932) ; State v. Ross, 193 N. C. 25, 136 S. E. 193 (1926).
This subject has previously been discussed in respect to the right to counsel.
Note, 27 N. C. L. Rav. 544 (1949). What was there said will not be reiterated
here.
" State v. Henderson, 216 N. C. 99, 3 S. E. 2d 357 (6939) ; State v. Green,
207 N. C. 369, 177 S. E. 120 (1934) ; State v. Whitfield, mupra note 37; State v.
Rhodes, 202 N. C. 101, 161 S. E. 722 (1931); State v. Sauls, 190 N. C. 810, 130
S. E. 848 (1925).
"State v. Gibson, 229 N. C. 497, 50 S. E. 2d 520 (1948) ; State v. Farrell,
223 N. C. 321, 26 S. E. 2d 322 (1943) ; State v. Jones, 206 N. C. 812, 175 S. E.
188 (1934) ; State v. Garner, 203 N. C. 361, 166 S. E. 180 (1932).
N. C. CoNsr., Art. I, §11 (1868).
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the accused employs counsel, the court assigns him counsel, or whether
he conducts his own defense.3 7
Additional protection is derived from confrontation in its assurance
to defendant that he may not be tried and convicted in absentia. 88 This
assurance that he may be present extends to the selection of the jury, 0
the reception of evidence, 40 the argument of counsel, 41 the charge to the
jury,42 the reception of the verdict,48 and the imposition of sentence, 44
but not to the return of the indictment in open court, 4" the argument on
motions for a new trial and similar motions,46 or the hearing on appeal
in the Supreme Court.4 7 In cases involving capital felonies the presence
of the accused is required at every step of the actual trial and cannot
be waived, either personally or by counsel.4 s In trials for felonies less
" Cf. State v. Hedgebeth, 228 N. C. 259, 45 S. E. 2d 563 (1947), aff'd, Hedge-
beth v. North Carolina, 334 U. S. 806 (1948) (On procedural grounds). On
principle, State v. Hedgebeth seems erroneous.
"' State v. O'Neal, 197 N. C. 548, 149 S. E. 860 (1929) ; State v. Hartsfield,
188 N. C. 357, 124 S. E. 629 (1924) ; State v. Freeze, 170 N. C. 710, 86 S. E. 1000
(1915) ; State v. Cherry, 154 N. C. 624, 70 S. E. 294 (1911) ; State v. Kelly, 97
S. E. 404, 2 S. E. 185 (1887) ; State v. Jenkins, 84 N. C. 812, 37 Am. Rep. 643
(1881) ; State v. Blackwelder, 61 N. C. 38 (1886) ; State v. Craton, 28 N. C. 164
(1845).
" State v. Dry, 152 N. C. 813, 67 S. E. 1000 (1910).
40 While there are no North Carolina cases directly in point, the solicitude of
the Court in protecting the accused's right to be present at other stages of the trial
warrants the inference that a jury view would constitute taking evidence and that
defendant would have the right to be present. Note, 12 N. C. L. Rv. 267 (1934).
See State v. Perry, 121 N. C. 533, 27 S. E. 997 (1897) ; Cf. State v. Stewart, 189
N. C. 340, 127 S. E. 260 (1925).
6 WiGmORE, EVIDENCE §1803 (3rd ed. 1940) takes a contrary view to the effect
that a jury view does not constitute taking evidence.
" State v. Pierce, 123 N. C. 745, 31 S. E. 847 (1898) ; State v. Paylor, 89 N. C.
539 (1883).
" State v. Hardee, 192 N. C. 533, 135 S. E. 345 (1926) ; State v. Matthews, 191
N. C. 378, 131 S. E. 743 (1926) ; State v. Sheets, 89 N. C. 543 (1883) ; State v.
Blackwelder, 61 N. C. 38 (1866).
, "' State v. O'Neal, 197 N. C. 548, 149 S. E. 860 (1929) ; State v. Freeze, 170
N. C. 710, 86 S. E. 1000 (1915) ; State v. Jenkins, 84 N. C. 813 (1881) ; State v.
Epps, 76 N. C. 55 (1877). Cf. State v. Austin, 108 N. C. 780, 13 S. E. 219 (1891).
In capital cases the trial judge cannot delegate to the clerk the duty to receive
the verdict in the judge's absence. See State v. Bazemore, 193 N. C. 366, 137
S. E. 172 (1927).
"State v. Brooks, 211 N. C. 702, 191 S. E. 749 (1937) ; State v. Cherry, 154
N. C. 624, 70 S. E. 294 (1911) ; State v. Kelly, 97 N. C. 404, 2 S. E. 185 (1887).
"State v. Stanley, 227 N. C. 650, 44 S. E. 2d 196 (1947).
"See State v. Hartsfield, 188 N. C. 357, 360, 124 S. E. 629, 631 (1924) ; State
v. Dry, 152 N. C. 813, 814, 67 S. E. 1000, 1001 (1910).
,' State v. Dalton, 185 N. C. 606, 115 S. E. 881 (1923) ; State v. DeVane, 166
N. C. 281, 81 S. E. 293 (1914) ; State v. Moses, 149 N. C. 581, 63 S. E. 68 (1908);
State v. Jacobs, 107 N. C. 772, 11 S. E. 962 (1890).
When the defendant becomes a fugitive pending appeal the Supreme Court may,
in its discretion, hear the appeal, dismiss the appeal on motion by the State, or
continue the case from term to term.
" State v. Matthews, 191 N. C. 378, 131 S. E. 743 (1926) ; State v. Dry, 152
N. C. 812, 67 S. E. 1000 (1910) ; State v. Blackwelder, 61 N. C. 38 (1866). But
cf. State v. Hardee, 192 N. C. 533, 135 S. E. 345 (1926) (Verdict of "murder in
the second degree" cured any error. Rule is to be applied only when verdict is
"guilty of murder in the first degree.") and State v. Trull, 169 N. C. 363, 85 S. E.
133 (1915) (Defendant under influence of opiates during trial of capital offense.).
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than capital the right can be waived by defendant personally.49 In
misdemeanor cases the right to be present may be waived personally
or by counsel. 50 Notwithstanding the rules as to waiver, no valid sen-
tence imposing corporal punishment may be rendered in the absence of
the accused. 5 '
Actual physical presence, alone, is insufficient. Confrontation de-
mands mental, as well as physical, presence.52 The most frequent
causes of mental absence are insanity, deafness, and inability to under-
stand the English language. A defendant who is insane at the time of
the trial may not be tried.53 Deafness and inability to understand Eng-
lish, however, do not prevent a trial of accused, consistently with his
right of confrontation, if adequate steps are taken to assure his mental
presence. 54 It would seem preferable, when it appears to the trial court
that such action is necessary, to require the court to furnish such means
of communication as is needed to enable defendant to understand the
proceedings, 5  in the absence of a prior express waiver. 56 Analytically,
the rules of waiver applicable to mental presence should conform to those
applicable to physical presence. But since physical presence is a mate-
rial, tangible fact, and in many cases mental presence is not, greater
" State v. Freeze, 170 N. C. 710, 86 S. E. 1000 (1915) ; State v. Cherry, 154
N. C. 624, 70 S. E. 294 (1911) ; State v. Kelly, 97 N. C. 404, 2 S. E. 185 (1887).
State v. Freeze supra, and State v. Cherry supra, state the rule to the effect
that counsel, in less than capital felony cases, cannot waive accused's right to be
present "unless expressly authorized thereto."
Dicta in State v. Matthews, supra note 48 and State v. Dry, supra note 48
state the rule to the effect that only defendant may waive the right. Accord, State
v. Pierce, 123 N. C. 745, 31 S. E. 847 (1898) (By implication).
"0 State v. O'Neal, 197 N. C. 548, 149 S. E. 860 (1929) ; See State v. Matthews,
191 N. C. 378, 384, 131 S. E. 743, 747 (1926).
"' State v. Brooks, 211 N. C. 702, 191 S. E. 749 (1937) ; State v. Cherry, 154
N. C. 624, 70 S. E. 294 (1911); State v. Paylor, 89 N. C. 539 (1883). Cf. State
v. Kelly, 97 N. C. 404, 2 S. E. 185 (1887) (Defendant fled as the jury was re-
turning to court with the verdict. The verdict was received but no sentence im-
posed. Several months later defendant was arrested and sentenced to corporal
punishment under the original verdict. Held: Affirmed.).
" Garcia v. State,-Tex.-, 210 S. W. 2d 574 (1948) ; State v. Vasquez, 101
Utah 444, 121 P. 2d 903 (1942), Note, 16 So. CAu.IF. L. Rav. 56 (1942) ; Terry v.
State, 21 Ala. App. 100, 105 So. 386 (1925), Note, 24 Micm. L. Rav. 305 (1926) ;
The King v. Lee Kun (1916), 1 K. B. 337, 9 B. R1 C. 1121. Cf. Marker v. State,
25 Ala. App. 91, 142 So. 105, cert. denied, 225 Ala. 141, 142 So. 108 (1932), Note,
66 U. S. L. Rav. 523 (1932).
"2 State v. Vann, 84 N. C. 722 (1881) ; State v. Harris, 53 N. C. 136 (1860);
Ashley v. Pescor, 147 F. 2d 318 (8th Cir. 1945) ; Howie v. State, 121 Miss. 197,
83 So. 158 (1919). See People v. Perry, 14 Cal. 2d 387, -, 94 P. 2d 559, 564
(1939).
* The cases cited in note 52 vtpra decide this point by implication.
"n Such a course has been adopted in the Superior Court and approved by the
North Carolina Supreme Court. See State v. Early, 211 N. C. 189, 189 S. E. 668
(1936).
Evidence received through an interpreter is not hearsay. State v. Hamilton,
42 La. App. 1204, 8 So. 304 (1890).
" Contra: Gonzalez v. People, 109 F. 2d 215 (3rd Cir. 1940) (Waived by
failure to insist on right to interpreter).
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care should be exercised to determine whether an intelligent waiver of
the right to be mentally present has been made.57 To dispel doubt,
the waiver required should be express and before the jury has been
selected.
It not infrequently occurs that a conflict arises between the right of
confrontation and the various privileges of witnesses. The issue in such
case is whether the right to confront is paramount or is subject to such
privileges. In the North Carolina case of State v. Perry5 8 a conflict
arose between confrontation and the constitutional right to refuse to
give self-incriminating testimony. It was held reversible error to refuse
to strike the direct. testimony after the witness claimed the privilege, on
the ground that the right to confront is a right to inquire freely and
fully into any relevant subject matter. A defendant claiming a consti-
tutional right should not be prejudiced by half-truths. 'This decision is
sound, and the principle should be applied regardless of the nature of
the privilege claimed 59 and regardless of the status of the witness,
whether he is a co-defendant, is to be separately tried, or is otherwise
disinterested.
The importance of State v. Perry lies in its limitation of prior de-
cisions to the effect that co-defendants are competent and compellable
to testify, though they may not be required to incriminate themselves.
The result of this case is that witnesses, including co-defendants, may
be required to testify"0 by the State,(1 but if a privilege is claimed by
a witness on cross-examination defendant is entitled as of right to have
the direct examination striken.62
As is true with various other protective devices, defendant may
waive his right to confrontation "By express consent, by failure to assert
it in apt time, or by conduct inconsistent with a purpose to insist upon
it."' 63 This observation is subject to the qualification previously noted
of the requirement of defendant's presence at a trial for a capital offense.
"' It is not intended here to intimate that no duty devolves upon counsel to call
the court's attention to accused's physical or mental defects. Of course, when
accused has no counsel the burden should be on the court to protect his rights in
this respect.
58210 N. C. 796, 188 S. E. 639 (1936).
: State v. Condry, 50 N. C. 418 (1858) (Attorney-client privilege disallowed).
'o State v. Howard, 222 N. C. 291, 22 S. E. 2d 917 (1942) ; State v. Smith, 86
N. C. 705 (1882). See also N. C. GEir. STAT. §§8-50, 54 (1943).
" But defendant may not insist that a co-defendant testify in his behalf if the
co-defendant claims a privilege against self-incrimination. State v. Medley, 178
N. C. 710, 100 S. E. 591 (1919). This view likewise preserves both constitutional
rights.
'2 Cf. State v. Weaver, 93 N. C. 595 (1885) ("It was not good ground of ex-
ception that the court told the co-defendant witness 'That he need not answer any
question which tended to criminate himself.' ")
08 State v. Hartsfield, 188 N. C. 357, 360, 124 S. E. 629, 631 (1924). Accord,
State v. Harris, 181 N. C. 600, 107 S. E. 466 (1921) ; State v. Mitchell, 119 N. C.
784, 25 S. E. 783 (1896) ; Gonzalez v. People, 109 F. 2d 215 (3rd Cir. 1940).
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The recent North Carolina case of State v. Gibson
64 retreats from
the commendable position taken by State v. Farrell
6" in regard to consti-
tutional rights and revives the doctrine of prejudicial error. Though
State v. Gibson involved the constitutional right to counsel the applica-
tion of the doctrine to confrontation may be deduced since the two
rights are closely interwoven. The clearest statement of the doctrine
is to be found in State v. Bea 66 wherein it is said that, "The foundation
for the application (for) a new trial is the allegation of injustice arising
from error, but for which a different result would likely have ensued.
. . . Unless, therefore, some wrong has been suffered, there is nothing
to relieve against. The injury must be positive and tangible, and not
merely theoretical." Obviously, the question of prejudice cannot arise
unless a denial of a right has been assumed without deciding, conceded,
or proved, hence such denial itself is only a theoretical injury. Two
criticisms may be made in regard to this doctrine. The first is that,
logically, the doctrine would sanction a star-chamber proceeding if de-
fendant were in fact guilty. In this aspect the doctrine is a negation
of the concept that the Declaration of Rights guarantees to every man
a fair and just trial. The denial of a fair trial should, of itself, be suf-
ficient prejudice. The second criticism is that an erroneous proceeding
deprives defendant of his presumption of innocence, which loss, under
the doctrine as stated, is not an actual, but merely theoretical injury.
6 7
The justification most frequently advanced for the application of this
doctrine is the public interest in certain and prompt punishment of
criminals. The public interest is not a stable compass when compared
with the Declaration of Rights. Further, the Court seems to overlook
the fact that the public has a counterbalancing interest in securing to
the accused his constitutional rights and that it was the purpose of the
Declaration of Rights to secure to the individual rights as against the
public.
The approach of State v. Farrell68 is to be preferred. There the
view is taken that, "Whether his defense before a jury after full prepa-
ration would have availed him is for the present purpose immaterial.
The law provides one mode of trial and it is the same for the innocent
and for the guilty." The distinction between the approach of State v.
0,229 N. C. 497, 50 S. E. 2d 520 (1948).
O,223 N. C. 361, 26 S. E. 2d 322 (1943).00 199 N. C. 278, 303, 154 S. E. 604, 618 (1930). Accord, State v. Heavener,
168 N. C. 156, 83 S. E. 732 (1914) ; State v. Smith, 164 N. C. 475, 79 S. E. 979
(1913).
"' This criticism of the doctrine has previously been made. Note, 27 N. C. L.
REv. 544 (1949).
0- 223 N. C. 321, 26 S. E. 2d 322 (1943). The North Carolina Supreme Court
has shown no inclination to accord State v. Farrell sympathetic treatment. See
State v. Hedgebeth, 228 N. C. 259, 265, 45 S. E. 2d 563, 567 (1947), aff'd Hedge-
beth v. North Carolina, 334 U.S. 806 (1948).
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Gibson69 and that of State v. Farrell lies in the purposes for which the
facts in the record are analyzed. In State v. Gibson the purpose is to
determine whether defendant has been prejudiced. The purpose in
State v. Farrell is to determine whether error has been committed. The
one focuses attention on the injury suffered, the other on the nature of
the constitutional provision in question. "You were not denied the
right" is a better answer to a claim of right than "You fail to show us
that the denial injured you."
Despite frequent and vigorous dissents, the United States Supreme
Court has uniformly refused to hold that the due process clause of the
14th Amendment of the Federal Constitution incorporates the Bill of
Rights as restraints on state action.7 0 Instead, the due process clause
is interpreted to impose federal prohibition on state deprivation of only
those rights which may be considered of ". . . The very essence of a
scheme of ordered liberty,"' rl or as ". . . Principle(s) of justice so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental." 72 It has not been squarely held that confrontation is
essential to due process, 73 but dicta in Snyder v. Massachusetts74 indi-
cate that, insofar as it assures an adequate opportunity to be heard and
the presence of the prisoner at the trial, it is considered fundamental.
To the extent that confrontation duplicates the right to counsel, this
protection may also be inferred from the decisions in the right to coun-
sel cases.
The procedure of the United States Supreme Court in appraising
the facts of each case and applying a subjective interpretation of due
process thereto75 has made the task of prognostication a matter of
chimerical surmise for the state courts, 7 6 and few objective criteria are
perceivable.
A pragmatical approach to constitutional rights, as exemplified by
the doctrine of prejudicial error, is not to be desired. In the effort to
60 229 N. C. 497, 50 S. E. 2d 520 (1948).7 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1946) (Black, Douglas, Murphy, and
Rutledge dissenting); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1944); Betts v.
Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1941) (Black, Douglas, and Rutledge dissenting); Palko
v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
"' Palko v. Connecticut, at 325, supra note 70.
72 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1933).
"' West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258 (1903) (The question was here presented
but not decided.).
71 Supra note 72, at 105 ("What may not be taken away is notice of the charge
and an adequate opportunity to be heard in defense of it.").
" Green, The Bill of Rights, The Fourteenth Amendnent and the Supreme
Court, 46 MIcH. L. REV. 869 (1948). (Professor Green thinks this procedure is
"... The purest and most absolute form of arbitrary and uncontrolled power, a
retreat into the deepest jungle of natural law, from the clearing which the Bill of
Rights has created." Id. at 900.).
, Newman v. State, 148 Tex. Cr. App. 645, 652, 187 S. W. 2d 559, 563 (1945)
("If the Supreme Court would prescribe some formula by which we may be
guided, our task would be much easier .. .').
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dispense criminal justice the means by which that end is to be achieved
are worth considering, as well as the end itself. Procedural due process
requires that the rules of evidence be shaped to conform to a sound
conception of the protective devices of the Constitution rather than
altering the concept to fit the rules. In the event the concept appears
outmoded change should be made through the prescribed procedure,
constitutional amendment, rather than by legislative or judicial erosion.7
7
MARSHALL B. SHERMIN, JR.
Federal Jurisdiction-Interpleader Act-Diversity
Requirements-Co-Citizenship of Claimants
The Federal Interpleader Act,' provides that the district courts of
the United States shall have original jurisdiction of bills of interpleader
and bills in the nature of interpleader 2 if "(i) Two or more adverse
'7 However no objection can be made to judicial or legislative prescription of
the minima of protection secured by constitutional rights. Chapter 112 N. C. Sess.
L. (1949) is to be commended as a step in the right direction. The Legislature
might well consider statutory authority for the State to take and use depositions
in criminal cases, preserving accused's right to cross-examine deponent when the
deposition is taken.
128 U. S. C. §41 (26) (1936). Chafee, The Federal Interpleader Act of 1936,
45 YALE L. J. 963, 1161 (1936). There has been a slight change in the wording
of the diversity requirement by 28 U. S. C. §1335 (1948). It now reads: "(i)
Two or more adverse claimants, of diverse citizenship as defined in 1332 of this
title. . . ." The Reviser's Notes to §1335 do not indicate that any change in the
requirement was meant to be effected by this change in phraseology and the sub-
stituted language does not seem to require a change therein.
2 Interpleader was a remedy which developed in the equity courts. It would
lie only if-(l) The same debt, duty or thing was claimed by all parties against
whom relief was demanded; (2) All adverse titles or claims were dependent upon
or derived from a common source; (3) The person seeking the relief did not have
or claim any interest in the subject matter; (4) The person seeking the relief was
a stakeholder, standing perfectly indifferent between the claimants.
Later, a plaintiff was permitted to bring a bill in the nature of interpleader,
though he claimed an interest in the subject-matter, did not admit all of the de-
fendants' claims or the defendants claimed different amounts (and hence strict
interpleader would not lie) if there was some basis for equitable jurisdiction other
than double liability or vexation. Both bills of interpleader and bills in the nature
of interpleader can be obtained under 28 U. S. C. §41(1) (1936) as amended by
28 U. S. C. §1332 (1948), as any other civil action and are subject to the limita-
tions therein (i.e. the sum in controversy must exceed $3,000, exclusive of interest
and costs; process may be served only within the territorial limits of the state in
which the district court is held; there must be diversity between plaintiff stake-
holder and defendant claimants; the only proper venue is the judicial district in
which all the plaintiffs or all the defendants reside). The Interpleader Act (szVpra
note 1) also permits bills of interpleader and bills in the nature of interpleader but
the relief is thereby made more accessible by: (1) making the crucial diversity
of citizenship that among the adverse claimants; (2) reducing jurisdictional amount
to $500; (3) allowing process to run throughout the United States; (4) making
the district where one or more of the claimants resides or reside a proper venue;
(5) allowing the suit to be entertained though the titles or claims of the adverse
claimants do not have a common origin, or are not identical but adverse to and
independent of each other. 2 Mooa's FEDERAL PA=c .C §§22.02, 22.03 (1938).
See Chafee, Modernizing Interpleader, 30 YALE L. J. 804 (1921).
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